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Transubstantiation in Canadian Public Law:
Processing Substance and Instantiating Process
∗

Mary Liston

I. INTRODUCTION
Canadian public law blurs process and substance, a result confirming the prevailing view that
this dichotomy ought never to be conceived as a simplistic bright-line distinction. Recent
developments have created more than just a blurring but, rather, a strong linking or even fusion
of the two. This paper probes the implications of these developments in public law. Section two
briefly presents the historic and jurisprudential distinctions between process and substance and
assesses its current legal import. Here I argue that judicially created analytic frameworks could
assist by bringing a process-substance problem to the surface and constraining its potentially
pernicious effects. Section three grounds this initial discussion in Canadian public law by
showing how the distinction generally appears in judicial review of procedures in administrative
law. The decisional framework employed in procedural fairness is examined. Sections four and
five turn to two significant new developments in Canadian public law. Section four considers
how the duty to consult and accommodate in public law completely fuses process and substance.
Aboriginal administrative law currently provides the most vibrant and dynamic jurisprudential
example of the conceptual puzzles that the distinction raises and its decisional framework
exemplifies many of the tensions discussed in the paper as a whole. Section five examines the
new Canadian approach to the substantive review of discretionary decisions and how the current
decisional framework may fall short in terms of rights protection. The paper concludes that the
‘transubstantiation’ of process and substance is conceptually and legally desirable due to the
cross-fertilization of rule of law and democratic norms in public law and that improved
decisional frameworks could fruitfully assist in this cross-fertilization.
II. SIGNIFYING PROBLEMS: PROCESS VERSUS SUBSTANCE IN GENERAL
JURISPRUDENCE AND IN PUBLIC LAW
A.

Two conventional approaches to the separation of process and substance and why
they don’t work

The distinction between process and substance was never as conceptually bright-line as
traditional jurisprudence would have it.1 The difficulty of rendering a clear distinction has long
*
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been noted, despite the fact that law schools continue to teach as if the dichotomy remains crystal
clear. 2 Even the strongest defender of the distinction—Jeremy Bentham—conceded that neither
could conceptually exist without the other. He may, however, have firmly agreed with Thomas
Hobbes that any suggestion that the two might be fused or co-exist in legal doctrines and analytic
frameworks would amount to utter nonsense not unlike that absurd religious claptrap called
transubstantiation.3
Traditional jurisprudence therefore relegates matters that affect the existence, extent, or
enforceability of rights and duties of the parties to a legal action as substance, not procedure.
Procedure would then encompass all matters relating to the fairness or efficiency of the litigation
and the evidentiary process (such as facts, judgments, and evidentiary rules). Alternatively, a
second traditional approach relegates issues concerning the manner and means needed to access
courts, the availability of remedies, and matters relating to justiciability as procedure. But fuzzy
boundaries rapidly arise.
Regarding the first approach—historically understood as a practical allocation—we
quickly come to an imprecise demarcation when the distinction is broadly considered from an
institutional and systemic perspective. We value procedural law in and of itself because it
conforms to the ideal of the rule of law (ie, a norm-governed process). The ideal of the rule of
law animates our collective hope that we can value, uphold, and legitimize a certain procedure
because it will more likely to lead to a just outcome.4 This potentially just outcome is partly
legitimated because it is the product of a fair procedure.5 The connection between procedure and
substance as a matter of procedural justice, in turn, validates the institution of the judiciary and
its associated legal practices. Substance and process are therefore inextricably entangled as a
matter of procedural justice and just institutions.6
2

Kocourek (n 1) 160-62 canvassed older jurisprudence proposing various ‘solutions’ to the conceptual problem by:
(1) suggesting that procedural rules are wholly equivalent to substance (John W Salmond); or (2) subsuming process
entirely into substance (Charles Frederic Chamberlayne); or (3) offering the notion of a penumbra or ‘twilight zone’
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‘“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws’). Kocourek (n 1) 164 re-characterized the problem by
suggesting the use of ‘telic rights’ instead of substance, and ‘instrumental rights’ instead of procedure, with the
result that: ‘“Telic” rights are those abstract rights whose realization is effected by the concrete application, directly
or indirectly, of “instrumental” rights’.
3
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782.
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Lawrence Solum argues that a complex view of the relationship between procedure and substance appreciates the
‘ineliminable and inherent entanglement’ between them. He suggests that the real work of procedure is to ‘provide
particular action-guiding legal norms’ across all areas of law for individuals and public actors: ‘Procedural Justice’
(2004) 78 Southern California Law Review 181, 224-25, 320.
6
See Rawls’s conception of just institutions on this point: J Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia
University Press, 1993) 72.
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The second approach encompasses several discrete points of fusion between process and
substance. Standing and other justiciability doctrines, for example, procedurally regulate the
initial stages of engaging the judicial process for accessing rights and enforcing duties. But, they
also contain a significant element of substance because they affect the ultimate result.7 Alexander
Bickel noted that when a court declines to hear a case on its merits, and provides little
explanation, it indirectly validates the government’s action as a matter of substance.8 Moreover,
by obtaining standing, a person is recognized as having legal status and a potentially valid legal
claim requiring judicial resolution. The litigant gains a substantive right of access to a further
protected right or enforceable duty. Standing is therefore an end in itself as a form of legal status,
but also entails the recognition that one’s claim is justiciable and one can therefore make use of
the available procedures to vindicate the right or enforce the duty. Standing further validates the
courts as the appropriate forum in which to hear the legal matter thereby confirming their
jurisdiction. In the way that many process and substance issues seem nested within each other,
jurisdiction itself is also a further matter of substance (ie, the lawful and legitimate exercise of
judicial power) and also of procedure (ie, the process used to structure a court’s discretionary
control over its own processes).9
To take another example, remedies combine process and substance because the substance
of remedial principles is closely connected to the procedures of the particular court in which they
are applied and because of their close connections with procedural doctrines of standing and
justiciability.10 Without standing and a justiciable claim, a complainant cannot use procedures to
access a remedy. And, finally, procedure may also include—if broadly construed—matters of
interpretation and rules originating in the democratic process, both of which are often labelled
substance.11
Contemporary legal scholars emphasize that the consequences of the process/substance
distinction are complex. Some consequences are concrete and relate only to the specific parties
in the case, while others are more general and concern the operation of the overall legal system
in terms of fairness, efficiency or justice.12 A difficulty arises, then, when we try to define the
scope of the outcome of the legal process. A narrow view of a legal matter will see the
consequences—and the process-substance dichotomy—differently than a broader scope that may
engage considerations of jurisdiction and just institutions. At its broadest, the distinction orients
us towards and grounds a conception of judicial review and its appropriate contours as expressed

7
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in the principle of the rule of law, the principle of legality, the doctrine of the separation of
powers, and the institutional demands of deference.13
We therefore must confront a legal characterization puzzle inevitably involving judicial
interpretation and issue framing.14 A formalistic approach will wish to see issues ‘naturally’
belonging to a particular category differentiated by form and function. 15 Over time, these
distinctions, if regularly applied and followed, will become a recognizable jurisprudential pattern
with set expectations. This process in law possesses some similarity with how ‘genres’ are used
to classify literary texts and other artistic works. Established authorities will rely on prior
characterizations of the distinction such as the two approaches outlined above, however different
institutions and areas of law contain the possibility of upsetting past characterizations and
generating different legal consequences. A legal issue or rule might be characterized as
procedural for one purpose, substantive for another, or even both at the same time. Does this
blurring raise the Hobbesian view that we are talking about a legal absurdity? The answer is
again no, but for a different reason than the categorization problem just discussed.
B. A pragmatic and functional approach to the distinction
Many legal scholars who acknowledge the intractable nature of the categorization problem also
concede that the legal distinction provides tactical and functional import in the management of
legal disputes. Blurred therefore does not mean muddled and muddy and it becomes incumbent
on courts to develop methods that help them navigate this difficult terrain, while exhibiting
transparency in the methods that they themselves devise. Judges must therefore strive to
faithfully apply the artificial reason and common law methods of reckoning that make use of
logic, proportionality, principles of equity, and justice.
In their article on the process-substance dichotomy, public law scholars David Dyzenhaus
and Evan Fox-Decent suggest that the process/substance distinction is fraught with difficulty
partly because the term ‘substance’ is itself ambiguous.16 Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent raise the
tantalizing suggestion that the traditional dichotomy is completely illusory—it is substance all
the way down—but ultimately reject this conclusion.17 They instead argue that the distinction is
not likely to disappear any time soon, that it does functionally serve to demarcate jurisdictional
issues between other branches and the judiciary, and that it involves a necessary complication
that points toward a defensible conception of judicial review in a democratic legal order.
According to them, substance designates a legal area where judges are less likely to intervene,
thereby engaging the principle of deference within a conception of the separation of powers.
Substance serves as a criterion to legitimate the activity of judicial review or its denial. ‘Process’,
on the other hand, indicates areas that the judiciary considers itself to be constitutionally charged
or deems itself capable of supervising.
13

D Dyzenhaus and E Fox-Decent, ‘Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v Canada’ (2001) 51
University of Toronto Law Journal 193, 196.
14
On categorization in law generally, see AG Amsterdam and J Bruner, Minding the Law (Cambridge and London,
Harvard University Press, 2002) ch 2.
15
See K Petroski, ‘Statutory Genres: Substance, Procedure, Jurisdiction’ (2012) 44 Loyola University Chicago Law
189, 240–43. The
16
Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent (n 13) 195.
17
Ibid, 196.
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Traditionally in public law, judges left substance to the legislature and the executive
while nominating themselves the guardians of procedure.18 Since the late 1970s and early 1980s
in Canadian administrative law, the dichotomy has tracked the changes from the traditional
‘Diceyan’ model of the judiciary with monopoly over adjudication, law interpretation and
supervision through a correctness standard in administrative law (for both procedure and
substance) to a more respectful judiciary that ought to exhibit ‘deference as respect’19 towards
the legislative and executive branches.
We can see this interplay at work in Canadian administrative law. Reviewing courts
examine administrative procedures for fairness, but elements of procedure also act as justifying
norms for the review of substance. The key link here—which will be discussed more fully in the
section three—is the provision of reasons. Reasons may be required as part of the content of
procedural fairness. But substantive review (ie judicial review of the decision or policy) also
relies on reasons. The outcome of the decision may be justified as reasonable if the result stems
from fair procedures and intelligible reasons. Here the legal dichotomy relies on an underlying
philosophical distinction between procedural and substantive norms, but reasons simultaneously
embody both types of norms. In Canadian administrative law (similar to administrative law in
other common law countries), the process-substance distinction therefore indicates two avenues
to access judicial review as well as at least two justificatory grounds for judicial deference to
another branch of government: 1) the recognition of fair procedure; and, 2) the recognition of
sound decision-making or policy application.
Moreover, the process-substance dichotomy also engages questions of jurisdiction in
public law, resolution of which in some respects operates in a manner akin to a conflict of laws.
20
In a conflict of laws matter where an inter-state legal dispute involves both domestic and
foreign law, the law of the forum governs matters of procedure, and matters of substance are
governed by a choice of law rule that could privilege either domestic or foreign law. In Canadian
administration law, a presumption of reasonableness has emerged in reasonableness review. This
strong presumption of deference applies to all administrative decision-makers operating within
their home statute in terms of process, interpretation, and substance. 21 At judicial review,
procedure is generally governed by judge-made common law, while substance is largely
informed by the statutory objectives and norms applied by administrative actors (subject to
common law judicial constraints on the scope of decision-making). In substantive review, the
administrative decision-maker’s authority is generally viewed robustly, but judges can use
common law principles to shape the exercise of discretion,22 to confirm or reject interpretive

18

Ibid,195.
Dyzenhaus, ‘The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy’ in M Taggart (ed), The Province of
Administrative Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1997) 279, 286 is the source for the idea of ‘deference as respect’.
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20
See Nollkaemper (n 4) on this point where he discusses how questions of jurisdiction are treated either as
questions of substance or procedure depending on the territory, on the context, and also on the particular area of law.
21
Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) [2013] 2 SCR 559 (presumption applies to all
administrative actors, not just adjudicative tribunals, and includes ministers and other statutory delegates).
22
Mission Institution v Khela 2014 SCC 24 (‘Khela’) (procedures involving discretionary choices may be owed
deference by a reviewing court).
19
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choices,23 to conclude that a decision does not exhibit rationality or proportionality,24 and to
reject unreasonable outcomes 25 . In sum, the (rebuttable) presumption of reasonableness
automatically privileges the interpretations and conclusions regarding substance, but also often
the procedures used, by administrative decision-makers thereby averting institutional conflict.
Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent argue that, despite its inherent ambiguity, the notion of
‘substance’ can serve a variety of functions including: 1) facilitating access to the remedy when
process serves to deny a particular outcome because substance indicates the possibility of a right
to a particular outcome; 2) indicating which body can define the content of procedural fairness
thereby legitimating the actions used by administrative body to render a decision; 3) pointing to
the form and content of procedural fairness when the statute leaves that determination to the
administrative body and its judgment about the weight of factors that it uses; 4) supplying the
justification requirement in procedural fairness, usually met by the provision of reasons, which
blurs into the substance or reasonableness of the decision; and, 5) indicating political morality—
understood in a conception of fairness—which informs legal conceptions of procedural
fairness.26
C. Good principles and proper methods
Instead of striving for a clear a priori distinction between process and substance, then,
contemporary thinking suggests that judges, lawyers, and administrative decision-makers
develop decisional frameworks and other higher-order legal rules that operate as a cognitive
process to bring these kinds of process-substance problems to the surface of legal thought and
judgment. 27 While a comprehensive discussion of cognitive or analytic frameworks is not
possible in this chapter, several insights from this growing literature are highly relevant.
A key text from cognitive science is Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman, a
book that illustrates the inescapable effects that experience, assumption, values, emotions, and
unconscious biases have on our ability to think clearly and come to ‘right reason’.28 According to
Kahneman, our mind is a dual-process model that contains two interactive modes of thinking,
both of which produce the ‘thinking I’. System 1 is like the operation of automatic pilot,
operating quickly and continuously with little effort and producing intuitive, unconscious
thought. It is impressionistic, metaphorical, associative, and cannot be switched off. It ‘authors’
our thought without us even being aware of its activity. System 2 is slower, deliberative and
23

McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission) [2013] 3 SCR 895, 2013 SCC 67 (administrative decisionmakers have the ‘interpretive upper hand’ in their home statute).
24
Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General) 2015 SCC 12 (‘Loyola’) (reasonableness review requires
proportionality and the minister must exercise discretion to advance the freedom of religion enjoyed by a Catholic
high school).
25
Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society [2011] 3 SCR 134, 2011 SCC 44 (‘Insite’) (the
minister’s decision not to grant an exemption for a provincial safe injection facility was arbitrary in substance and
disproportionate in its effects).
26
Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent (n 13) 195-96. This links back to the understanding of fairness in Rawls’s theory of
justice.
27
This kind of jurisprudential resolution is one that even Hobbes might approve: ‘The first cause of Absurd
conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method … .’ See Tuck (n 3) 35.
28
D Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Toronto, Anchor Canada, 2013).
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more effortful, requiring our attention when it is operative. It is associated with agency, choice,
concentration, and complex computations and so is considered more rational.29 System 1 controls
most of our actions and generates a ‘narrative’ that allows us to make sense of the world we
encounter. It enables us to perform the thousands of daily complex tasks we need to do, but
unconsciously and often automatically. It is, however, prone to common reasoning errors
because of its associative nature and its mode of ‘jumping to conclusions’. System 2 kicks into
gear when System 1 is challenged and it can oversee and correct System 1, but only if pushed to
do so, because it is lazy.
This relatively recent research on human cognition contains valuable insights for law.
Foremost is the fact that when decision-makers (either individual persons or professional
decision-makers) approach the decision-making process, they unavoidably bring background
influences and values with them, not all about which they are aware.30 Judges form ideas and
beliefs about issues and people by drawing on their previous experiences, both personal and
professional. Such expert intuition, Kahneman suggests, can be reliable if a field requires skills
to discern and an environment that is sufficiently regular to be predictable.31 Law and legal
reasoning can satisfy these requirements, and this fit is often expressed in the concept of
‘common sense’ deliberation.32 Nevertheless, these regularities do not necessarily arise to a
robust statistical level of the kind typical of poker playing, medicine, stocks, and athletics.
Instead of pretending that a completely objective judgment is achievable, judges should
mitigate arbitrariness by using thinking techniques that encourage them to be ‘mindful’.33 These
techniques can stimulate and support System 2 modes of thinking. Common techniques include
being open to new information in order to check conclusions and avoid overconfidence, taking
into account more than one perspective in order to counter tunnel vision,34 and creating new
categories to (re)sort information. These techniques may help us to understand how we make
errors in choices and judgment. They make us aware of the role of our emotions in deliberation

29

See Kahneman (n 28) chapters 1–3 for further elaboration.
For elaboration on these points, see Kahneman (n 28) chapters 4–5.
31
See Kahneman (n 28) chapter 6.
32
Insights from cognitive science animate the legal literature on jury deliberation, procedural problems resulting in
miscarriages of justice, judicial biases based involving stereotypes, and promoting empathy in judicial decisionmaking. See SA Bandes, ‘Remorse and Demeanor in the Courtroom: Cognitive Science and the Evaluation of
Contrition’ (2013) DePaul Legal Studies Research Paper No 14-05 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2363326)
N Negowetti, ‘Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the Limits of Perception’ (2012) Valparaiso University Legal
Studies Research Paper No 12-15 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164325); DL Martin, ‘Lessons about
Justice From the Laboratory of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt, and Informer
Evidence’ (2001–02) 70 University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 847; Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of
Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001).
33
The literature on ‘mindfulness’ zeroes in on the contextualized nature of thinking or judging, rather than empirical
models of the brain. See J Nedelsky, ‘Receptivity and Judgment’ (2011) 4 Ethics & Global Politics 231; J
Nedelsky, Law’s Relations (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011).
34
Nedelsky’s work on reflective judgment focuses on overcoming cognitive biases like tunnel vision. Nedelsky
claims that mindfulness is an imaginative act of contextualized thinking that leads the rational agent to challenge her
own subjectivity by broadening her frame of reference. Contrast this with Martha Nussbaum’s work on empathy and
judgment where she describes empathy as ‘an imaginative reconstruction of another person’s experience’ that does
not require us to align our interests with that of another person. Nussbaum (n 32) 302.
30
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and direct us to analyze how our internal narrative framing affects beliefs, choices, and
assessment of facts or evidence.35
These analytic frameworks cannot resolve the problem of characterization but, instead,
guide thinking so that choices can become more consciously made, more transparent, and ideally
accompanied by reasons explaining why a particular categorical choice or generic distinction has
been made. This is important when we realize that characterization is not just performed for a
practical purpose, but has sometimes profound normative consequences. With a framework in
place, a court can either develop further or re-visit prior characterizations made by legislatures,
parties, lawyers, lower courts, and administrative decision-makers. Attention therefore shifts
from a focus on one-and-for-all fixing the difference between substance and process to a
necessary examination of how well these frameworks and their accompanying interpretive
methodologies are working.
This section has argued that the process/substance distinction, while tenable, is fraught
with tensions and must be viewed as shifting and complex. Substance informs process and
process legitimizes substance ultimately providing the justificatory grounds for judicial review as
a set of institutional practices and normative choices. The answer lies in becoming aware of how
and why a legal matter is characterized as one or the other and what results from that. Not all
doctrinal areas make use of decisional frameworks that aim to bring substantive-procedural
characterization matters into sharper focus. Canadian administrative law, however, does.
The chapter now turns to three recent examples of this blurring of substance and
procedure and the three frameworks that have been created to assist: procedural fairness, the duty
to consult and accommodate, and substantive review of discretionary decisions.
III. CROSS-FERTILIZATION OF PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE: PROCEDURAL
FAIRNESS AS THE FIRST FAULT LINE
Section II briefly examined how the process-substance connection already exists in public law
generally and administrative law in particular. It probed how the distinction is used to, among
other functions, establish jurisdiction thereby legitimizing judicial review. When the processsubstance distinction is raised, one can readily discern the presence of fault lines or stressors in
the jurisprudential terrain. These stressors create high anxiety in appellate judges who see the
implications of the distinction and know that a particular stressor can quickly and easily crack
open the ‘Pandora’s Box of legality’.36 This section first presents the current framework used to
determine the content of procedural fairness in Canadian administrative law. It then turns to the
three main stressors in procedural fairness—legitimate expectations, weight, and reasons—
stressors that resonate in developments that the next two sections consider.
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See Kahneman (n 28) chapter 34.
Evan Fox-Decent uses this term to describe the judicial anxiety arising from the realization that procedural
fairness has substantive implications. See E Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (New York,
Oxford University Press, 2011), 189–190.
36
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A. The Baker framework for determining the content of procedural fairness
In Canadian administrative law, a reviewing court asks one overarching question to determine
the content of the duty of fairness for review of the procedures used by an administrative
decision-maker: Was the procedure used in this case fair considering all of the circumstances?
To answer this question, a court employs what is now termed the ‘Baker framework’—an
analytic, decisional framework of the kind identified in section two.37 When considering and
applying the framework, the reviewing court must find a balance among an open list of factors
and principles that include:
The Baker Framework
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

the nature of the decision and the process followed
the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of review
the importance of the decision to the individual(s) affected
the legitimate expectations of the persons challenging the decision
the need to respect agency expertise in determining and following its own procedures

Despite strong judicial statements that no one factor takes priority over the other, four of these
factors ‘pull’ a reviewing court closer to or further away from deference, minimal intrusion, and
a sole focus on process: 1, 3, 4, and 5. I have used the phrase ‘pull’ to indicate that some factors
may carry more ‘weight’ in the context of a particular case, though they may appear neutral
initially. A reviewing court accords weight to a particular factor that, in turn, may pull the judges
towards greater scrutiny and intrusion. Factors 3 and 4 indicate elements that most clearly blur
the process/substance distinction and move what is generally conceived solely as review of
procedures towards review on substantive fairness grounds.38
B. How the framework blurs process and substance
Regarding Factor 1—the nature of the decision and the process followed—less deference or
more scrutiny will be demanded if, for example, the nature of the decision is closer to the judicial
process or if a right of appeal exists. Most courts take the traditional view that tribunals are not
owed ample deference on procedural fairness matters and that the standard of fairness is a
rigorous one akin to correctness. More deference, however, may be appropriate when the
enabling statute delegates broad discretion to make procedural choices to the decision-maker.
The result is a lessening intensity in the standard of review for procedures—from a stricter
standard akin to correctness towards a reasonableness standard that reflects respect for agency
expertise (or Factor 5). In other words, Factors 1, 2, and 5 can combine to produce a posture that
mirrors the reasonableness standard used in substantive review.39 The Supreme Court of Canada
in the Khela decision best expressed this contextually deferential stance using the words “margin
of deference” to the administrative decision-maker (in this case a Commissioner or Warden of a
37

Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817, [21]–[28].
For commentary on the concept of substantive fairness in Australian and New Zealand administrative law, see K
Stern, ‘Substantive Fairness in UK and Australian Law’ (2007) 29 Australian Bar Review 266 and DR Knight,
‘Simple, Fair, and Discretionary Administrative Law’ (2012) 2 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 34.
39
For academic commentary on the possibility of fusing procedural and substantive review in this way, see P Daly,
‘Canada’s Bi-Polar Administrative Law: Time for Fusion’ (2014) 40 Queen’s Law Journal 213.
38
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prison) who employed a procedure that required the exercise of discretion (in this case,
withholding information from the prisoner).40 More deference will be accorded if the nature of
the decision is polycentric in substance (ie involving many parties) or if it involves complex
considerations regarding the public good. More deference will therefore be shown to an
administrative body that is acting ‘legislatively’ or in complex policy matters rather than
‘judicially’—terms that are both synonyms for substance and process respectively. 41 Cases that
fall at the legislative end may be viewed as near non-justiciable or highly inappropriate for
judicial review.
More content will also be required if the decision involves a strong individual right and
the decision is very important to the individual (eg matters concerning livelihood, personal
security, reputation and so on).42 The Baker framework is a balancing exercise implicitly guided
by the principle of proportionality. Factor 3 implicitly compels judges to engage in minibalancing or proportionality exercise since the substance of the individual right must be weighed
relative to the other factors that may compete. In practice, the content of procedural fairness
varies mostly depending on the strength of Factor 3—the right, interest or privilege being
weighted as more or less important against the other variables. This mini-proportionality review
within procedural fairness calls into play concerns about the limits of judicial review,
parliamentary supremacy, and legislative intent. Canadian administrative law wavers between
adhering to legislative intent, primarily through statutory communications about process
requirements, and engaging in judicial creativity by augmenting content on common law
grounds. As Paul Craig argues, the “reality was that a general presumption of legislative intent
had to be framed in abstract terms, to the effect that Parliament believed in justness between
citizen and government and that this generated a general legislative intent that statutes should
comply with the precepts of public law developed by the common law courts over time, subject
to any special legislative intervention … ”.43 The Baker framework has brought into focus, but
not really at the surface, demands for ‘process legitimacy’ that blur the process-substance
distinction in judicial decisions.44
In some cases, the weight given to a particular factor will be the same as the initial
decision-maker, but in others the court may re-determine weight explicitly or implicitly and the
re-weighting may have substantive remedial effects. When Factor 1 is more substantive—that is
more legislative or discretionary or broadly policy-oriented—then Factor 3’s weight may be
quite curtailed or even eliminated. But when Factor 3 is strong, and the remedy is the decision
gets sent back for reconsideration, the practical effect may be that the decision-maker has before
40

Khela (n 22) [89]. The concept of ‘substantive fairness’ as a fusion of process and substance appears to be on the
horizon in Canadian procedural fairness, but it is as unclear whether or not it has any legs.
41
For a discussion of so-called legislative decisions, see G Huscroft, ‘From Natural Justice to Fairness – Thresholds,
Content, and the Role of Judicial Review’ in C Flood and L Sossin (eds), Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed
(Toronto, Emond Montgomery, 2013). Cabinet and ministerial decisions, for example, may be exempt from the
common law duty of fairness if they are characterized as broad policy decisions or appear legislative in form (eg an
order-in-council).
42
Note, however, that procedural fairness protects not just rights, but also privileges and interests. See Cardinal v
Director of Kent Institution [1985] 2 SCR 643, 653.
43
PP Craig, ‘The Nature of Reasonableness Review’ (2013) 66 Current Legal Problems 131, 160.
44
Fox-Decent (n 36) 189 discusses how the majority in the Knight case amplified the content of procedural fairness
using, in part, the principle of legitimacy.

10

them only one possible outcome, and process blurs into substance again. This was the result in
the Baker case. The administrative official had to reconsider the original decision to deny Mavis
Baker an exemption to apply for permanent resident status on humanitarian and compassionate
grounds by taking into greater account the best interests of her Canadian-born children. Only two
possibilities therefore remained for that office: to approve or deny the exemption. The exemption
was approved. As a result of this case, greater substance—weightier principles and additional
values—were simultaneously imported into the process of judicial review as well as the
decision-making procedure used by immigration officials. In many cases, a procedural remedy
like reconsideration (certiorari combined with mandamus) will have a substantive result because
the decision-maker will be so constrained by the court’s reasoning and final determination that
only one option will be before her: using an improved process to render the same decision as the
court.
Factor 4 distinguishes Canada from some other common law jurisdictions, like the United
Kingdom and South Africa. 45 Canadian jurisprudence explicitly and repeatedly states that
legitimate expectations confers only procedural protection and is available only if government
conduct includes an overt promise, representation, undertaking or regular practice.46 If Canada
had substantive legitimate expectations, instead of only procedural, then Factor 4 would have the
potential to exert greater pull. To date, Canadian courts have shown no willingness to revisit the
jurisprudential ousting of substantive legitimate expectations in administrative law.47 This denial
of substantive legitimate expectations makes the Baker framework appear more ‘procedural’
than ‘substantive,’ but this is a false conclusion for several reasons.
C. The three ‘stressors’: weight, legitimate expectations, and reasons
Firstly, as discussed above, the mini-proportionality exercise required by Factor 3 blurs process
and substance by requiring reviewing courts to weigh the five factors and balance them against
each other. Secondly, and briefly adverted to above, the denial of substantive legitimate
expectations makes the Baker framework appear more procedural than substantive, but this is a
false conclusion overall and one that is subject to no jurisprudential change around legitimate
expectations. It may only be a matter of time, and with the right case, that Canadian public law
reverses the bright line it has drawn between procedural and substantive legitimate expectations
and follows the lead established by courts in South Africa and the United Kingdom.48 Thirdly,
45
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and as discussed in section two, the duty to give reasons further erodes the distinction between
process and substance in judicial review.
Canadian scholars have long noted that the connection between dignity interests,
legitimacy, and the common law reasons requirement. In an early analysis of Baker, David
Mullan stated that the Supreme Court came ‘close to trading in “fairness” as a substantive and
not purely procedural concept. … Indeed, it serves to further emphasize that there is no bright
line between procedural and substantive review.’ 49 Very quickly, the reasons requirement
became a problem for judicial review. Litigation around the quality or adequacy of reasons
further stressed the distinction since it was not clear if poorly executed reasons constituted only a
procedural flaw or were properly a matter for substantive review as the reasoning undermined
the reasonableness of the decision.
The Supreme Court recognized the possibility that a severe fault line around the reasons
requirement could completely collapse the distinction between process and substance and moved
quickly to shore it up in the Newfoundland Nurses case.50 In this case, the Court confirmed that
inadequate reasons are indeed not reviewed under procedural fairness but, rather, through
reasonableness review. The only question regarding reasons in review for procedural fairness is:
are reasons required by the common law or not? All other questions regarding the adequacy—in
form or content—should be dealt in substantive review. By relegating the adequacy of reasons to
substantive review, the court was also able to re-affirm its own jurisdiction. Procedural fairness
review could continue to treat the absence of reasons with more judicial scrutiny since
procedural fairness is akin to correctness review in Canadian administrative law. The Court
therefore affirmed its traditional guardianship and checking of administrative procedures. The
Court then bolstered its more deferential stance in substantive review by affirming that the
adequacy of reasons is a matter for reasonableness—not correctness—review. By making this
move, the Court forestalled another potential stressor—the collapsing of the distinction between
reasonableness review and review of the merits of the decision—by removing the possibility of
using the most intrusive standard, correctness, to get at the merits through the reasons that were
offered or could be offered to support a decision.51
Legitimate expectations, weight, and reasons are three stressors for the process/substance
distinction in procedural fairness. While the Supreme Court has worked hard to protect common
law procedural review from these stressors, their disruptive potential has come to the fore in a
related, but novel, area of law—the duty to consult and accommodate in Aboriginal
administrative law.
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IV. EXPECTING LEGITIMACY: THE DUTY TO CONSULT AND ACCOMMODATE AS
THE SECOND FAULT LINE
This section analyzes the process/substance distinction in what is now called Aboriginal
administrative law in Canada. Aboriginal law is a distinct area of public law and involves
constitutional, common law, statutory law, international law, and increasingly Indigenous
customary law. In keeping with the overall historical development of Aboriginal law in Canada,
the duty to consult and accommodate differs significantly from other forms of consultation and
accommodation in public law such as those found in labour and human rights law. Instead, it is a
sui generis blend of administrative and constitutional law. This is because the source of the
various duties differs, originating in the early sovereign-to-sovereign relations between the
British Crown and Indigenous peoples. The roots of Aboriginal public law therefore predate the
establishment in 1867 of the positive legal authority that Confederation represents in Canada.
A. The honour of the Crown as the guiding principle for process and substance
The Royal Proclamation of 176352 constitutes one fundamental source of the Crown’s legal
relations with Indigenous peoples in North America. Key promises from the Royal Proclamation
include the Crown’s overall obligation to protect Indigenous rights from settler encroachment,
the guarantee that Indigenous peoples should be able to access to a legal system in order to
benefit from good governance, and the promise to resolve disputes equitably through a judiciary
committed to the rule of law. The Royal Proclamation has been interpreted as one key source for
the fiduciary nature of the constitutional relationship between the Crown and Indigenous
peoples.53 It is also a source for the resulting principle of the honour of the Crown, which the
Supreme Court of Canada describes in this way in the landmark Haida Nation case:
Put simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, and were
never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims with the sovereignty of the Crown
through negotiated treaties. Others, notably in British Columbia, have yet to do so. The
potential rights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be determined, recognized and
respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting honourably, to participate in processes
of negotiation. While this process continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to
54
consult and, where indicated, accommodate Aboriginal interests.
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These promises, and the subsequent understanding of the Crown-Aboriginal fiduciary
relationship, informs section 35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982, the provision which
constitutionally guarantees Aboriginal rights.55
The duty to consult and accommodate acts as a sub-principle of the principle of the
honour of the Crown. It can arise in four contexts: historical treaties, comprehensive modern land
claims agreements, proved Aboriginal rights and title, and unproved Aboriginal rights and title.
The duty rests on both federal and provincial governments and their agents, representatives,
and/or delegated authorities. 56 The duty will therefore also engage decisions made by
administrative actors and tribunals. 57 The duty primarily regulates the relations among
Indigenous peoples, the executive branch, and the courts.
My main interest is with the most vulnerable area: unproved rights and interests. Though
not fully grounded in the fiduciary nature of the principle of the honour of the Crown—because
the interests and rights have not yet been recognized (unlike s. 35 rights)—the duty nevertheless
entails that government action which negatively affects an unproved Indigenous right and
deprives the community of their benefits—real or potential—will be found inconsistent with this
principle and will require protection from the courts. Otherwise, the integrity of the
constitutional order would be at risk because the judiciary would be permitting the Crown to run
roughshod over potentially weighty, but unproved minority rights, and the judiciary’s legitimacy,
in turn, would be imperiled. Recognized Indigenous rights possess independent force or
presumptive weight that ought to be given priority in government decision-making implicating
broad policy or economic considerations, and the need to and balance with other competing
rights and interest.58 Unrecognized rights and interests do not carry this same weight, but may
become recognized and hence are vulnerable in the transition stages to full recognition.
Importantly then, Haida Nation provides a framework for preventing the abuse of claimed
Indigenous rights in the early stages before they achieve full status in Canadian law.
These types of Indigenous rights cases involve often profound uncertainty about the
nature of the right. Moreover, the implementation process for fulfilling the duty is complex due
to multiple stakeholders in the affected community and many non-legal variables including
economic, political, cultural and social factors. The judicial approach to Crown-Aboriginal
relations that the Haida Nation framework represents also relieves the judiciary from a variety of
remedial dilemmas including imposing interlocutory injunctions on government or private action
and also forestall ongoing supervision by the courts. In many respects, the substantive remedial
tail waived the procedural rights dog in the original case and this problem—how far should
courts go to protect Indigenous rights?— plagues the case law. This result confirms the two
problems that Lawrence Solum suggests procedural justice must face: (1) to provide accurate
55
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outcomes at a reasonable cost; and (2) to address the deeper problem of working out shared goals
when a consensus about these goals may not exist.59
B. The framework for the duty to consult and accommodate
Similar to common law procedural fairness, the duty to consult and accommodate in Aboriginal
administrative law works with a higher-order, decisional framework—but it is much more
complicated than the Baker framework and even further instantiates process and substance. The
legal framework that crystallized in the Haida Nation case has two functions. First, it aims to
guide negotiations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous governments when established
Indigenous rights and interests are affected by non-Indigenous decision-makers at both the
federal and provincial levels of government. Second, it aims to prevent the abuse of Indigenous
rights and interests in the stages before they obtain full legal recognition.
The framework for the duty to consult and accommodate contains two parts: (1)
consultation, which is largely, though not wholly, procedural in nature; and (2) accommodation,
which is mainly substantive, but is also procedural. The procedural components of the duty to
consult mirror those commonly found in the duty of fairness in administrative law but, because
of the constitutional nature of the Indigenous right or interest, the content of the norm does differ
and, unlike common law procedural fairness, involves specific reciprocal duties on both the
Crown and Indigenous peoples.
The Haida Nation framework is premised on an ideal model of stages and steps that a
government should follow if it wishes to fulfill the duty satisfactorily. Four stages are
contemplated, each with its own set of steps that to be implemented: 1) Stage 1 examines the
Crown’s real or constructive knowledge; 2) Stage 2 involves a spectrum approach to determining
the scope of the duty that rests on the Crown; 3) Stage 3 determines if consultation obligations
have been met or are required; 4) Stage 4 considers whether or not accommodation is required
and, if it is, what is its content. Each stage is accompanied by the standard of review a court will
use to examine the decision when it is challenged at that particular time in the framework. The
table below sets out the framework:
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Solum (n 5) 320.
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Framework for the Duty to Consult and Accommodate
Steps

Stage 0

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Stage 4

Crown engages in
high-level strategic
decision-making in
various policy areas.

Crown has
knowledge (real or
constructive) of a
potential Aboriginal
right or title.

Crown determines
scope of duty by
engaging in a
“spectrum” analysis.

Crown consults with
affected parties
(consultation need
only be adequate).

Accommodation
(may be required).

Step 1 of Stage 1
“The trigger” of
Crown knowledge.

Crown engages in the
first miniproportionality
analysis by balancing
the strength of the
Aboriginal claim with
other variables such
as the potential
impact on the
right/interest and/or
public interest.
If the claim is strong,
then deep
consultation and
maximum
responsiveness is
required; the
opposite, if not.

Crown needs to
identify relevant
parties.

Crown balances
competing interests in
a second miniproportionality
analysis and must
demonstrate that
Aboriginal interests
were considered
usually through the
provision of reasons.
Stage 4 may require
modification of
decision or policy to
minimize impact on
Aboriginal peoples.

Correctness for
strength of claim and
severity of impact.
Unless decision
involves a large
degree of factual
determination, then
reasonableness.

Reasonableness /
fairness regarding
adequacy of process
of consultation.

Reasonableness or
correctness regarding
adequacy of
accommodation
required.
Reasonableness
regarding outcomes
and balancing of
interests.

Substeps

Step 2 of Stage 1
Crown decides to act.
Step 3 of Stage 1
Crown knows of
potential adverse
effect from its
decision to act.

Standard of
review

No review of Crown
discretion at this
stage.

Reasonableness

Ideally, the duty to consult and accommodate permits courts to oversee the executive branch to
check the wide-ranging power of the Crown chiefly by eliminating broad or unstructured
discretion.60 A reviewing court will accord a margin of appreciation to the process used and the
policy choices made by the Crown in either of the two proportionality analyses indicated in the
table above. A reviewing court will ask whether or not consultation was reasonably adequate
given the circumstances. In order to answer this question, the reviewing court will need to look at
whether the process used was meaningful in proportion to the seriousness of the harm. It should
also examine whether the Crown’s practice of informing itself and consulting affected parties
was in good faith. Lastly, the reviewing court considers whether or not a reasonable balance was
struck between Indigenous and other interests/values in its final decision, including whether or
not the outcome is reasonably accommodating of the prioritized Indigenous interests. The
standard of review ‘toggles’ according to the particular stage with case law confirming that
correctness is the norm for the question of law concerning the strength of the claim but with
reasonableness as the preferred standard for other components of the duty. Notably, as the table
above indicates, reasonableness and fairness are often fused when scrutiny turns to the adequacy
60
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of the consultation process indicating a tangled movement towards substantive procedural
fairness in this jurisprudence.
In this area of public law, the duty to consult and accommodate completely fuses process
and substance. Process, however, routinely works to undermine substance because of judges’
desire to avoid the underlying issues of emergent Indigenous sovereignty, development of selfgovernment as a more complex form of Canadian federalism, and demands for a post-colonial
relationship. Though never fully addressed in consultation cases—indeed, the conundrum of
sovereignty is often submerged even in Aboriginal title cases—the duty must manage conflicts
arising from the existence of multiple communities whose claims contradict the unilateral
assertion of Crown sovereignty originally made by the British sovereign. In this area, then, the
two major ‘stressors’ are relations between sovereigns and polycentricity.
The duty, however, is plagued by key structural weaknesses including: the burden of
knowledge on under-resourced Indigenous groups to specify alleged infringements as well as
potential harms; the problem of inadequate notice to affected Indigenous communities; the
presence of too much Crown discretion; judicial deference; and inadequate accommodation. The
weakness that I want to focus on is accommodation since accommodation is the final stage of a
process (consultation), but is also a substantive end in itself and therefore fuses the distinction.
C. How the two stressors create a sub-optimal fusion of process and substance
At judicial review, Haida Nation advises judges to focus ‘not on the outcome, but on the process
of consultation and accommodation’.61 These instructions—at odds with how the standard of
review works in administrative law in general—seem to indicate strongly that those procedural
violations, rather than unreasonable outcomes, will first trigger a remedy. Conventional
administrative law remedies such as remitting an unsatisfactory consultative case back to the
original decision-making to engage in further consultation (process), or to reconsider some of the
factors that lead to the original unreasonable decision (substance), often leave a vacuum given
the breadth of Crown discretion, potential for unilateral arbitrary, behaviour, or lack of capacity.
Conventional remedies regularly result in the under-enforcement of Indigenous rights through
the duty to consult and accommodate. The two major stressors—relations between sovereigns
and polycentricity—account for both legal complexity and sub-optimal enforcement.
We can see that the envisaged process demands that government decision-makers make
efforts to understand the interests that are asserted by Indigenous claimants and to assess the
potential harms that Indigenous communities perceive government action might cause. This
awareness, however, does not always translate into substantial accommodation whereby action is
barred or policy is markedly modified.62 What kinds of actions will be inconsistent with the
Crown’s duty? Again, it is up to the decision-maker to determine as a matter of discretionary
judgment the intensity of the effects of infringement, resulting in both a skewed process and a
potentially arbitrary outcome. The process selected by the government decision-maker could fail
61
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and thereby never attend to the need for accommodation because it did not allow for the kind of
knowledge that is essential for the assessment of the impact and harm. The decisional framework
of the duty seemingly aims to correct for this possibility, but anxieties about substance often
mean that this potential is not realized.
André Nollkaemper argues that the procedures employed to guide and shape substantive
law themselves reflect normative choices and our assessment of these choices depends on
“whom we want to entrust with making them.”63 Aboriginal administrative law illustrates a
collective action problem when public values, which require recognition and enforcement, are
weakened. These values are ‘public goods’ requiring protection in the name of individual cases
and the larger public interest. If government decision-makers do not consult properly, they will
inevitably fail to accommodate properly, and the process/substance connection will function suboptimally. Nollkaemper further writes that: “Procedures, and the voices that can be heard
through procedure, are part of the process for identifying what a public good is, how to interpret
it and how to strike balances when it comes to conflict with other public goods.”64 We need to
know if those claimants who are making use of legal procedures and framing legal arguments see
their own understanding of values and public goods reflected back in administrative and judicial
decisions. The substantive political issues of recognition and representation and the
corresponding existential problems of Indigenous loyalty, voice and exit anxiously percolate
throughout these cases.
The process/substance problem is further exacerbated when multiple parties and decisionmakers are involved—as is often the case in this polycentric area where a case may involve
several Aboriginal groups, more than one government decision-maker, industry third parties,
and/or interest groups. Nollkaemper, citing examples from international law, calls the kinds of
complex public goods prevalent in these cases ‘aggregate-effort’ goods and includes cases
involving climate change and nuclear weapons as examples.65 The uncertainty posed by the
unproved rights and interests, combined with the polycentric nature of the cases, invites a high
degree of deference from reviewing courts. Indeed, these cases appear at the ‘legislative end’ of
the spectrum of decisions that a reviewing court may or may not review. Though this paper does
not consider claims that common law procedural fairness should be extended to address citizens’
demands for greater democratic participation in government or regulatory decision-making, it
does, however suggest that Indigenous participatory rights should be increased to overcome the
prohibition against interfering in policy-oriented or ‘legislative’ decisions.66
Courts are increasingly grappling with these aggregate and competing public goods and
disagreement exists over the question of which substantive values procedural rules should serve.
Courts may also not be fully attentive to, or not wish to address, the balance of power.
Procedural fairness and lack of substantive equality between the parties may pull the judge in
different directions. As Thomas Main argues, procedures are ‘an instrument of power that can, in
63
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a very practical sense, generate or undermine substantive rights.’67A paradox emerges whereby a
court may seek to preserve ‘the value of an intermediate good [which] may undermine its
contribution to the final public good.’68 The intermediate good that the courts are protecting is
the legitimacy of judicial review. Courts are of course a good worth protecting, but their
approach to the duty to consult and accommodate undermines a final public good such as the
protection of Aboriginal rights (from the perspective of Indigenous peoples) and reconciliation
(from the perspective of the larger Canadian public interest which also includes Indigenous
peoples). No easy solution exists for this problem, but the application of the current framework
prevents examination of the implicit choices judges make in order to skirt the ‘big questions’.69 I
suspect that if Canadian jurisprudence acknowledged the presence of substantive fairness and
substantive legitimate expectations in procedural fairness, then the fairness of consultative
procedures and accommodations might be made more transparent and rigorous.70
Looking at the duty to consult and accommodate from the perspective of process and
substance in procedural fairness discussed in section three, the differing roles accorded to
legitimate expectations is manifest. If we understand a legitimate expectation simply as an
expectation that deserves judicial protection based on a government promise, representation or
practice then it initially seems akin to but less onerous than the fiduciary duty that underpins
state-Aboriginal legal relations. But jurisprudence from England (and Wales) suggests that
substantive legitimate expectations can play as weighty a role as the fiduciary duty does in
Aboriginal administrative law. In the leading English case on substantive fairness, Coughlan,71
the Court of Appeal explained the different forms of protection available for expectations: 1) the
government must give appropriate weight to the previous policy or other representation and, if it
does, the courts will review on a highly deferential standard; 2) if the promise or practice induces
a legitimate expectation of, e.g., being consulted, courts will then require that outcome unless
there is an overriding reason to deny it; and 3) if a legitimate expectation is established, and the
benefit is substantive rather than procedural, a reviewing court will weigh whether frustrating the
expectation is so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power.72 In Coughlan, the promise to Mrs.
Coughlan of a home for life was very important and the financial consequences of holding the
authority to account were minimal, so the court decided in her favour.
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In more recent cases, however, the English courts have moved away from this
categorized approach toward one where proportionality is the appropriate test, subject to
deference since substantive unfairness is a ground that does not generally justify judicial review.
Once an applicant, establishes the legitimacy of the expectation, the relevant authority must
identify any overriding interest on which it relies to justify frustration of the expectation. The
courts will then step in to weigh the requirements of fairness against the overriding interest(s)
and demand objective justification that the measures used were proportionate in the
circumstances.73 Deference will be shown when the authority proves—through evidence and/or
reasons—that its refusal or failure to honour the expectation was justified in the public interest
and that it had carefully considered both the substance of the issue and fairness concerns as
highly relevant factors in its decision-making process. Proportionality, again, is key and provides
the mechanism to link, join or fuse process and substance.
Canadian judicial direction to focus on process at the expense of outcome is at odds with
contemporary constitutional and administrative law. The Charter Section 174 balancing exercise
employed under the Oakes test, for example, explicitly incorporates into the analysis the
outcome under step 2. The framework for the Oakes test has two steps, the second with three
substeps: (1) there must be a pressing and substantial objective; 2) the means to achieve it must
be proportional; (2a) the means must be rationally connected to the objective; (2b) there must be
minimal impairment of rights; and (2c) there must be proportionality between the infringement
and objective. 75 Moreover, it shifts the burden to the government to justify the consequences so
that they are consistent with both upholding constitutional rights and permitting their limitation
when such limits further legitimate democratic goals. Similarly, under reasonableness review in
administrative law—as well as under the new Doré76 framework for assessing discretionary
decisions that implicate Charter values (discussed further below)—the court may invalidate a
decision on the basis of the unreasonableness of the outcome, as well as the process of
articulating the reasons supporting the outcome. Procedural rules implement substantive law to
produce quality outcomes as measured by norms embedded in substantive law and the decisionmaker’s own reasons.77 But, in the duty to consult, we see that process undermines substantive
legality, legitimacy, and the recognition of potential rights.
If we hold institutional comity in mind, it is not a breach of that doctrine to hold an
authority to account to decisions and choice to which it has committed itself, unless it provides
reasons indicating legitimate grounds to support a change of mind. Following Timothy Endicott,
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then, a continuum of different kinds of expectations might exist attracting greater or lesser
substantive content. Legitimate expectations could range from the largely minimal as in current
procedural fairness to the more maximal as in current Aboriginal administrative law.78 In either
case, this component fuses process and substantive to explicitly acknowledge the role of
substantive fairness. Duty to consult cases that involve unproved interests and rights raise real
concerns about abuses of power. If we agree with Timothy Endicott that ‘[i]t can be procedurally
unfair to disappoint an expectation without a hearing, and it can be substantively unfair to
disappoint an expectation. And then the decision is unlawful if it is procedurally unfair, or it is so
unfair in substance that it is an abuse of power …’79 then the duty to consult and accommodate
and procedural fairness share a similar the problem wrought by the process/substance distinction:
further jurisprudential development of substantive (un)fairness, better reason-giving, and explicit
proportionality analyses within their respective decisional frameworks. Greater attention to
outcomes may result in the minimization of infringements on unproved but strong Aboriginal
rights, the lessening of impact of activity on Indigenous land so that it does not disrupt
Indigenous use and occupation (especially given the requirement of prioritization), and go some
distance to accommodating Indigenous peoples’ preferred mode of exercising their rights as part
of self-governance.
V. CONSUBSTANTIATING PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE: REVIEW OF
DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS AS THE THIRD FAULT LINE
The analogous legal frameworks employed in administrative and constitutional law have—or
are—developing proportionality analyses that protect fundamental rights and values, permit
justified limitations through the provision of adequate reasons, and exhibit deference where
appropriate. These frameworks permit reviewing courts to assess the legitimacy of the substance
and the outcomes which limit or harm important rights and values. Section three showed how
analysis is bifurcated in procedural fairness since the presence of reasons is a question for
procedure while the adequacy of reasons is a question for substantive review. Section four
illustrated how the duty to consult and accommodate shares these features, but does not always
succeeded in justifying the limitations or fully attend to the consequential harmful effects of the
decision, despite employing two mini-proportionality analysis and insisting that the decisionmaker correctly assess the strength of the claim and the severity of the impact (potentially, but
only if outcomes are considered).
In the 2012 Supreme Court of Canada decision, Doré, the Supreme Court overturned the
past methodological approach that was used in previous jurisprudence to review discretionary
decisions involving Charter interests and values. The Supreme Court confirmed that the old
orthodox approach used to review whether or not a law justifiably infringes a right or freedom—
the Oakes test—should not replace administrative law review of discretionary decisions. Doré,
affirmed that an administrative decision-maker must not disproportionately and unreasonably
limit a Charter right or value when exercising a statutory discretion.
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A. The framework for the standard of review involving discretionary decisions
In exercising discretion, the decision-maker should first identify the relevant statutory objectives
as well as the values pertinent to that statutory context.80 Once identified, the decision-maker
then engages in a balancing exercise that involves weighing the relevant statutory objectives and
the Charter values. The decision-maker needs to consider how Charter values will best be
protected in light of the statutory scheme. This involves engaging in a proportionality analysis
that balances the severity of the interference (if any) with the importance of the statutory
objectives. 81 The decisional framework used by courts to review the resulting decision on
substantive grounds contains four factors:
The Standard of Review Framework
1.
2.

Look to past jurisprudence to see how particular category of question was addressed—if satisfactorily—regarding level of
deference owed.82
If not satisfactory, contextually analyze using the modern purposive approach to statutory interpretation four factors:
a. the presence or absence of a privative clause;
b. the purpose of the tribunal as determined by interpretation of enabling legislation;
c. the nature of the question at issue;
d. the expertise of the tribunal.83

A reviewing court will exhibit deference to a decision-maker’s decision that is the result of this
balancing exercise. 84 The appropriate standard of review for discretionary decisions that
implicate Charter values is reasonableness contextually applied.85 Since the Dunsmuir86 case,
and with a recent fundamental qualification, reasonableness has so far been confirmed as the
presumptive standard for reviewing administrative decisions in administrative law when: (1) a
specialized or expert tribunal; (2) interpreting its enabling or home statute; (3) on a question of
fact or mixed fact and law; (4) or has the jurisdiction to consider questions of law; (5) or is
exercising broad statutory discretion; (6) correctly applies all legal principles or tests; (7) to
construct an interpretation of its statutory powers that falls within the range of possible
acceptable interpretations; (8) resulting in a decision that demonstrates justification, transparency
and intelligibility; (9) and produces a reasonable outcome which is defensible in respect of the
facts and law. Should the tribunal satisfy all of these conditions, the reviewing court must find
the decision reasonable. So far, correctness review has been relegated to the margins, but not
ruled out.87 Following Dunsmuir, the proportionality test will be satisfied if the measure falls
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes and is explained by reasons exhibiting
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justification, transparency and intelligibility. The principle of deference informs this exercise, as
a reviewing court must recognize that when the nature of the decision is discretionary,
polycentric and involves balancing competing considerations, micro-managing by courts should
be eschewed.88
Entrenched fundamental values are recognized as having deontological weight, but it is
permissible to limit these values if the limitation is proportionate, accompanied by a legally
structured justification, and the harmful effects minimal. In Canadian constitutional law, this
methodology is embedded in the Oakes test that pragmatically combines deontological and
consequentialist considerations. We have seen part of this common law methodology in both
procedural review and the duty to consult and accommodate. Recent administrative law cases
therefore indicate that the post-Charter cross-fertilization of Canadian administrative and
constitutional law continues.89 But, as Dyzenhaus and Fox-Decent claim:
To generalize that methodology in the common law of judicial review is undeniably to
reform administrative law. Elements that were part of administrative law, but not central
to it, move to centre stage. Talk of unfettered discretion and jurisdictional talk become
gradually obsolete as they are replaced by talk of structures of justification. No hard and
fast distinction between process and substance is available, as recognition grows of the
inevitable substantive implications of process as well as of the fact that the justification
for having process at all is in some sense substantive.90

As discussed above, the movement of reasons into substantive review confirms this view because
reasons have now taken centre stage in Canadian administrative law.
B. Comparing current frameworks for process and substance
But, the modern reform of Canadian administrative law clearly needs to continue. To that end, I
want to engage in a synthetic thought experiment using the framework from procedural fairness
and that from substantive review, at the same time keeping in mind the fault-line around
substantive fairness that the duty to consult and accommodate discloses. The following table
compares the two frameworks used in reviewing procedures and substance:
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Comparison of the Baker Framework with the Framework used in Substantive Review91
What is similar and
what is not

Baker five-factor framework for determining the
level of procedural fairness

Standard of Review decisional framework (formerly
the pragmatic and functional analysis)

Overlap

Nature of the decision (and the process followed).
May involve interpretation or discretion regarding
procedures.

Nature of the question:
law, fact, mixed fact and law, or discretion.

Unique

---

Privative clause.

Overlap

Nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of review.
Weight of home statute.

Language/purpose of the provision and within the Act
as a whole.
Weight of home statute.

Overlap
[when dicta included]

Importance of the decision to the individual(s) affected.

Decisions must reflect the “fundamental importance” of
Charter values.

Unique

Legitimate expectations of the person(s) challenging the
decision.

---

Overlap

Respect agency expertise in determining and following
own procedures particularly with respect to its home
statute.

Expertise of the tribunal particularly with respect to its
home statute.

Role of reasons

May be required by the common law.

Reasons must demonstrate justification, transparency,
and intelligibility.

Consequentialism

Defensible outcome in respect of facts and law.

Reasonable outcome in respect of facts and law.

When placed side-by-side like this, the overlap is striking. The nature of question, the statutory
scheme, the weight of fundamental values along with the concurrent demand for proportionality,
the requirements of deference in the acknowledgement of expertise, and the role of reasons in
terms of justifying the outcome are all shared between the two frameworks. The key differences
are: the role given to a privative clause as a different ground for deference in substantive review;
legitimate expectations as a separate factor in procedural fairness; and, the bifurcation of reasons
between procedure (providing reasons) and substance (examining reasons for reasonableness and
rationality in the decision under review). As discussed above, Canadian administrative law
currently burbles with tensions and overlaps between process and substance and this
juxtaposition of the two frameworks underscores a vital question: does the distinction between
process and substance in administrative law have any continued salience given that the two
frameworks used in judicial review markedly overlap and could potentially be combined?
Furthermore, what might the implications be for Charter review and the Oakes test? Could one
simple overarching test in public law be constructed that takes into account rights, legislative
intent, and the principles of deference, legality and proportionality?
C. Hypothesizing one universal, overarching framework for public law
If, as I have suggested above, Canadian law embraced substantive fairness, acknowledged more
transparently the need to identify and specify the content of fundamental values explicitly in
proportionately analyses, and conceded that reasons consubstantiate substance and process, we
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might re-imagine a court reviewing process and substance using a unified framework.92 This
framework and its animating questions might look like the following ‘macro review’
framework:93
Overarching Framework When Distinction is Removed
Question asked

Framework element

What is being challenged?

Nature of the decision and/or the process followed.

What guidance does the statute
provide?

Nature of the statutory scheme, terms of review, and purpose of the provision.
Note that the framework subsumes the private clause into the statutory scheme but gives it
heavy weight instead.

What are the animating principles and
values in the home statute as well as
those identified by the person who is
challenging the decision?

Identify the fundamental values implicated in the case as a whole.

How much deference is owed?

Respect agency expertise in procedures and in interpretation of the law under the home statute.

Are the reasons adequate?

Demonstrate justification, transparency, and intelligibility appropriate to the context.

Is the outcome reasonable?

Outcome / effects of limit are proportionate.

My intent here, however, is not prescriptive. Major renovation of the current frameworks used
for procedural fairness and substantive review seems highly unlikely in Canadian public law
right now. The point is that if courts acknowledged the process/substance connection—rather
than merely distinction—the decisional framework used for judicial review in administrative law
might be simplified by being shared between the two domains. Weighting factors would move
into the spotlight, fairness would be assessed substantively and contextually, attention to
outcomes would be more robust, and courts could finally explicitly recognize that agency
expertise includes interpretation and not just procedure. Deference would be grounded in these
considerations combined with a transparent examination of the values brought to the case from
the statute, the common law, and the parties. Reasons would identify and harms and would
explain the rationale for upholding, expanding or denying individual rights and the exercise of
government power. In this manner, the principle of deference could therefore embody the
connection between procedural and substantive norms and, in turn, structure the scope of judicial
review.
In short, acknowledgement of the process/substance connection would affect the
Canadian model of judicial review. It would ground deference differently and move it closer to
‘deference as respect’ ideal where administrative decision-makers are recognized as expert
partners, though not co-equals, in coordinate construction of the constitutional order. 94
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VI. CONCLUSION: RITES OF TRANSUBSTANTIATING PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE
The previous section concluded that process and substance are connected—indeed, even
transubstantiated in administrative law—but my argument also concedes that the terms continue
to serve functional and descriptive purposes in practice. The reality of many features of the law
is not just the co-existence of these attribute, but their necessary and reciprocal intermingling.
Acknowledging the reality of the connection should lead not just to the creation of higher-order
decisional frameworks but also to better and more transparent application of these frameworks.
In other words, the focus is on better and best practices. Accepting the existence of substantive
fairness in the doctrine of legitimate expectations would be one example of a better practice
within a best practice framework. As both Geneviève Cartier and David Mullan contend, ridding
ourselves of pernicious and formalistic effects of the process/substance distinction in
administrative law permits the ‘real questions’ to be asked and demands that public officials and
judges provide ‘real answers’ in their decisions.95
This conclusion is also based a consideration of the importance of fundamental values
whose content and reach are being currently worked out in Canadian public law. These fault
lines have had beneficial effect. They suggest that the Canadian practice of judicial review now
rests on substantive ideals or values and that judges use these substantive criteria as guidance and
for justification. These values include democracy, dignity, equality, autonomy, and human
rights.96 Or, as L’Heureux-Dubé J writes in the Baker decision: ‘…discretionary decisions will
generally be given considerable respect … discretion must be exercised in accordance with the
boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of the rule of law, the principles of
administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society, and the principles of the
Charter.’97
A political community committed to both democracy and legality will provide multiple
routes for those affected by public power to demand fairness, to have input into the decisionmaking process, and to have quality reasons for those decisions. These considerations constrain
public power under the rule of law, but they also enable members to participate as members of a
democracy, as rights holders, and as claims-makers. The reasons requirement furthers
accountability, but it also provides the bases for public justification and judicial deference to
administrative decisions. Of the three areas canvassed, Aboriginal administrative law shows the
potential for greater democratic content, despite its current flaws. The procedural nature of the
duty to consult and accommodate for Aboriginal communities as emerging constitutional
partners means that democratic participatory rights are heightened and the decision-maker may
be required to change her mind in order to avoid substantive unfairness. This duty stands as a
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touchstone for emerging substantive content on consultation, participation and accommodation
in other areas of public law.
These ideals, however, place enormous stress on both the traditional ‘Diceyan’ and
quintessential American model of judicial review. The stress is mitigated, but not removed, by
the provision of reasons. Reasons place a burden and an advantage: the burden rests on the
decision-maker to justify their decision according to fundamental values, but the advantage shifts
in judicial review because judges must look to the justification given for the outcome, not just
the outcome itself. In administrative law, this means that correctness review is presumptively
foreclosed and, when the judge disagrees with both the reasoning and the outcome, must herself
engage with the decision and provide her own justification for a different result. Moreover, there
are many ways for other branches to respond to judicial decisions in administrative law. This
creates a more responsive, transparent, and accountable relationship between the judiciary and
other institutional actors, an ideal that in Canada is called “institutional dialogue.”98 Just as
importantly, an institutional dialogue which permits a fruitful connection between process and
substance can also buttress and generate “dialogue rights” and relations among individuals,
groups and decision-makers that go beyond the content of more conventional duties and rights.99
Both democracy and the rule of law justify the creation of institutional mechanisms for
citizens and affected persons to prevent or challenge the abuse of power by public officials. As
we have seen, the rule of law supports the creation of procedures that treat individuals fairly
when their rights, interests and privileges are affected in public decision-making. The rule of law
also supports judicial review of administrative decisions on their merits and greater access to the
courts through the expansion of standing and intervener status. The hope here is that judicial
deliberation will lead to better and more reasonable decision-making processes and policy
outcomes. A participatory democracy will create conduits for direct participation in decisionmaking and greater accountability through both legal and public oversight. Deliberative practices
such as reason-giving support the creation of open processes for public reasoning and debate and
may lead to more justifiable public policies. At their best, these practices show how “our shared
sense of justice is compatible with a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines” inherent in
a liberal-democratic culture.100 Contemporary governance therefore offers a range of institutional
possibilities for public participation on democracy and rule of law grounds. 101 From my
examination of recent developments in administrative law, I look to the larger democratic
potential of public law to better realize the connection between procedural fairness and
substantive public law values for all affected persons, citizens or not, in a liberal democracy.102
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As most modern political theorists contend, the modern state in pluralist conditions
fundamentally depends on the working out of substantive values through institutional practices
that contribute to procedural legitimacy in public institutions.103
The legal frameworks examined here should, and in some cases do, amount to practices
of discourse that, when properly engaged, are reflexive in nature and compel claimants and
decision-makers to become more transparent about their background suppositions concerning
rights, goods and conceptions of justice. These frameworks disclose the reciprocal relationship
between process and substance. I have argued that the relationship between process and
substance contains the further promise of our ability to bootstrap the reciprocal relationship
“between government and citizen with respect to the observance of rules,”104 standards, and now
fundamental values in Canadian liberal-democracy.
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